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A Discussion of Criteria for Non-ad-hoc-ness in the Methodology 
of Scientific Research Programmes 
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Zusammenfassung 
Das Problem, unter welchen Bedingungen eine Hypothese oder Theorienmodifikation als 
methodologisch akzeptabel gilt, wird in der wissenschaftstheoretischen Tradition als die Frage des 
Ad-Hoc-Charakters von Hypothesen diskutiert. Das gleichartige Problem tritt abet auch in 
Lakatos' Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme auf, welche yon methodolo- 
gisch zul/issigen Theorien~nderungen die Vorhersage ,neuer Tatsachen' verlangt. Uber diesen 
Begriff der neuen Tatsache und damit der Ad~quatheitsbedingungen fiir wissenschaftliche 
Erkl~irungen hat sich eine weitgef~cherte D batte ntsponnen, tn diesem Papier wird der Versuch 
unternommen, die Forderung der unabh~ngigen Testbarkeit einer Hypothese, welcbe im Rahmen 
der Diskussion des Ad-hoc-Charakters yon Hypothesen eine wichtige Rolle spielt, auch ffir die 
Frage der Spezifizierung yon ,neuen Tatsachen' fruchtbar zu machen. Ich argumentiere zugunsten 
der Bedingung, dai~ eine Hypothese als methodologisch akzeptabel gelten sollte, wenn sie 
zumindest zwei unabh~ngige Tatsachen erkl~irt. Ein derartiger Ansatz verlangt die Kennzeichnung 
dessen, was als ,eine Tatsache' zu gelten hat. Die Schwierigkeit einer derartigen Kennzeichnung ist 
eln notorisches Problem jedes Kriteriums, das auf unabh~ngige T stbarkeit zielt. Eine Kl~irung 
dieses Problems wird fiber das Konzept der empirischen Generalisierung versucht. Als ,eine 
Tatsache' im methodologischen Si ne gilt demnach ein gesetzm~iger Zusammenhang zwischen 
zwei Mef~gr6t~en. Dies erlaubt weiterffihrend eine Kl~irung des Problems, was methodologisch als 
,ein Experiment' zn werten ist, d.h. was als Reproduktion desselben und was als andersartiges 
Experiment gelten soll. Mit Hilfe dieser Kl~rungen wird unter anderem der Ad-hoc-Charakter der 
Lorentzschen Kontraktionshypothese sowie das Problem der Gleich- oder Verschiedenartigkeit 
yon Michelson-Mortey- und Kennedy-Thorndike-Experiment untersucht. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
Hempel's paradox of confirmation proceeds from two very plausible 
premises to an absurd conclusion. If it is agreed that (1) any positive mpirical 
instance of a hypothesis confirms this hypothesis and that (2) if such an 
empirical instance confirms ahypothesis t also confirms ahypothesis logically 
equivalent to the first one, one has to admit the conclusion that facts which 
apparently have nothing to do with a hypothesis actually confirm this 
hypothesis. Let 'All ravens are black' be our hypothesis. A logically equivalent 
form of it is: "What is not black, is not a raven'. A pink elephant is an empirical 
instance of this hypothesis. We have to conclude, therefore, that a pink 
elephant constitutes empirical support for the claim that all ravens are black. 1 
The usual reaction to this rather odd way of reasoning consists in giving a 
stricter sense to the notion of 'confirmation'. Not just any fact explained by a 
i cf. Hempel 1965, 14-15; Gethmann 1984. 
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theory confirms or supports this theory; on the contrary, the explanation has 
to meet certain methodological requirements. Conformity to the facts is only a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the acceptance of a hypothesis. In 
the tradition of methodological theory the need for the further qualification of 
a hypothesis has been discussed under the rubric of avoiding ad hoc 
hypotheses. What is essentially at stake, therefore, is the problem of what is 
constitutive for an ad hoc explanation. I want to discuss this problem within 
the framework of Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes 
(MSRP). Lakatos requires that the successive versions of a research pro- 
gramme must constitute a series of 'progressive problemshifts'. Each such 
version, emerging from its predecessor by adding or otherwise adjusting 
auxiliary hypotheses, must predict 'novel facts'. 2But what is a 'novel fact'? In 
other words, what kind of evidence really supports atheoretical modification ? 
In the last decade, an extended ebate has arisen among MSRP proponents 
concerning the problem of giving exact criteria for the novelty of a fact. This 
problem roughly coincides with the traditional problem of the ad-hoc-ness of
an explanation. 3 In Lakatos's methodology the concept of 'novelty' or 'non- 
ad-hoc-ness' lies at the heart of the problem of assessing theories. Most of the 
key MSRP notions uch as 'progressive' or 'degenerating programmes' remain 
vague unless we can determine what constitutes confirming evidence. Clarify- 
ing this problem is central to elucidating the assessment problem. 
What I want to propose in this paper is a novel criterion of novelty. I will 
argue for the following agreement about what should be considered as a non- 
ad-hoc explanation: 
A hypothesis explains a fact in a non-ad-hoc manner, if it simultaneously 
explains at least one additional independent fact that either constitutes an 
anomaly for the rival theory or that falls beyond its realm of application, i. e. 
that is neither derivable from nor inconsistent with the competing approach. 
In order to make this criterion plausible it is necessary first to review the 
discussion within the MSRP concerning the problem of novelty. In order to 
avoid becoming too scholastic in tone this review will have to be rather 
sketchy. But I will try in any event o present all the essential features of the 
debate. 
Lakatos originally considered a fact as novel which was "hitherto unexpec- 
ted". 4 This is a very strong requirement. I  demands not only that a 'novel' fact 
was previously "not known', but that it was also improbable in the light of 
accepted knowledge. As a result, this strong requirement was 'watered down" 
by a second condition. In addition, the 'old facts" that a programme explains in 
a new way should also count as 'novel' and therefore as supporting evidence. 5 
2 cf. Lakatos 1970, 32, 48. 
3 This ist only a rough coincidence because one of the usual characteristics of an ad hoc 
hypothesis that it is introduced for the sake of anomaly repair. The novel fact debate, however, 
is concerned with the legitimacy of any theoretical modification, regardless of the reason for its 
being introduced. 
4 Lakatos 1970, 33. 
5 1.c., 70. 
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In 1973, Elie Zahar rightly analyzed Lakatos's approach to the issue as an 
irresolute wavering between a strict predictivism and the partly successful 
attempt to count new explanations of known results in favour of a research 
programme. Relying on the theoretical context account of meaning, Zahar 
pointed out that because any novel theory entails a change in the connection 
between some of its theoretical concepts and the aspects of reality attached to 
them, almost every statement ofthe theory can be considered as offering anew 
explanation. And thus it becomes a novel fact in Lakatos's weak sense. 6This 
reveals the dilemma. On the one hand, our epistemological intuition requires 
that we credit Newton's deduction of Kepler's laws, Bohr's explanation of the 
Balmer series or Einstein's olution of the Mercury perihelion anomaly to the 
corresponding theory, although all these facts were already well-known at the 
time the explanatory theory was developed. On the other hand, one cannot 
say that any reproduction f a familiar fact by a programme constitutes a 
success of that programme. This would allow for the most phantastic ad hoc 
explanations. 
Under what conditions can a fact be said to support a theory? Zahar 
attempts to provide an answer. In the case of a theory explicitly designed to 
account for certain facts, we certainly do not hold that the theory is genuinely 
supported by these facts. This implies that the way in which a theory is devised 
becomes an important part of its methodological ssessment. Facts merely 
accomodated by the theory do not count as supporting evidence. Zahar 
concludes: 
This suggests the following redefinition of the notion of 'novel fact'. A fact 
will be considered novel with respect o a given hypothesis if it did not 
belong to the problemsituation which governed the construction of the 
hypothesis. 7 
John Worrall later summarized this criterion this way: 
one can't use the same fact twice: once in the construction of a theory and 
then again in its support. 8
In general, this criterion is no obstacle to predictions. If a fact was not 
previously known, it will generally not have been used in constructing the 
explanatory theory. 9According to Zahar, however, this criterion also implies 
that Einstein's theory is supported by the explanation of the Mercury 
6 Zahar 1973, 102. Noretta Koertge also criticizes Lakatos's "lapse into the we-live-in-a- 
different-world-after-a-revolution syndrome. If he wants to count a research programme as 
progressive when it is found to predict a known result, he should say" just so" (Koertge 1971, 171). 
7 Zahar 1973, 103; partially italicized in the original. Zahar's criterion was partly anticipated by 
Whewell who stated that "the evidence in favour of our induction is of much higher and more 
forcible character when it enables us to explain and determine cases of kind different from those 
which were contemplated in the formation of our hypothesis" (Whewell, in: Butts 1968, 153; 
italics in the original). 
8 Worrall 1978a, 48. 
9 One might suspect that this is not only "generally' but universally so, but Campbell and Vinci 
presented a counter-example. They consider the case of a modification of a theory which was 
intended to be a different explanation of a fact predicted by a rival theory which had been 
undetected up to that point; cf. Campbell/Vinci 1983, 327. 
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perihelion anomaly precisely because Einstein did not try to explain it. The 
solution to the problem was rather an unexpected present. 1° In addition, 
Zahar's approach leads to the assessment that the explanation f the retrograde 
planetrary movements and other immediate consequences of the crude 
Copernican model already supported the model and not only the first 
confirmed prediction, the actual observation of the phases of Venus in 1616.11 
Zahar's approach is fraught with difficulties. In 1974, Alan Musgrave 
pointed out that according to Zahar's notion of support, the way in which a 
scientist arrived at his theory is of decisive importance in appraising this 
theory's methodological merits. Moreover, methodological ssessment be- 
comes an exceedingly thorny endeavour because of the role biographical 
details play in tracking down the steps by which the scientist arrived at his 
theory. This means that identical achievements by two different scientists can 
be appraised very differently depending upon how they reached their results.12 
Musgrave's point can be made even stronger. His objection presupposes 
that at the very least the problem situation of a single scientist can be 
adequately reconstructed. Uncertainty in the methodological ssessment 
would thus only emerge if several scientists formulated the same theory but 
were motivated by a different set of problems. The situation, however, is 
worse. History of science is in many cases incapable of unambiguously 
reconstructing a scientist's problem situation. Let me illustrate this by 
examining a typical dispute among historians of science concerning the origin 
of an important idea, say, the genesis and early development of Lavoisier's 
oxygen theory. Meldrum has suggested that one of Cigna's articles, published 
in May 1772, probably provoked Lavoisier's eries of experiments in the same 
year since Lavoisier's first experiments on combustion dealt with the very 
same substances that Cigna had investigated: sulphur and phosphorus. 13
Others have proposed that the origins of the Chemical Revolution are to be 
traced back to the contemporary debate on the mysterious disappearance of 
diamond under high temperatures. At the beginning of the 1770s some 
scientists concluded that the phenomenon ought o be interpreted as the actual 
combustion of diamond. It seems plausible, therefore, that Lavoisier thought 
combustion processes to merit special attention. TM Guerlac dismantles these 
assertions 15and replaces them with his own account of the leading role 
effervescence played in Lavoisier's experiments. Lavoisier considered efferves- 
cence to be the release of air previously fixed in boddies. In pursuing this idea 
10 Zahar 1973, 257. 
ll Lakatos/Zahar 1976; according to this approach, the Copernican programme was progres- 
sive from the beginning. But it seems doubtful whether this account is well suited to the historical 
data. There was actually no mass conversion of astronomers to the Copernican programme (and 
tt~erefore no basic value judgement favouring this programme) prior to the discovery of the phases 
of Venus (see Nunan 1984, 285-286). 
12 Musgrave 1974, 12-14. 
I~ cf. Guerlac 1961, 77. 
14 op.cit., 78; Guerlac mentions MeKie, Duveen, and Klickstein as advocates of this view. 
15 op.cit., 79-90. 
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further, Lavoisier arrived at a new theory of air, regarding it as a compound of 
an aerial base and caloric, the matter of heat. These freshly formed ideas 
directed La~coisier's attention to he reduction of metallic alces where air was 
likewise set free. Since it was very natural to view this process as an 
effervescence, the next step for Lavoisier was to examine the nature of 
combustion and calcination. Guerlac oncludes that it was 
the phenomenon f effervescence observed in the reduction of metals which 
pointed the way to his great series of experiments. 16 
Morris shifts the accent. He takes the genesis of Lavoisier's ideas to be the 
genesis of a novel theory of the states of matter. Thus, he argues that Lavoisier 
regarded the release of combined air and vaporization as analogous processes. 
The result in both cases is a compound with caloric, the matter of heat being 
responsible for the elastic properties. Lavoisier then developed this account 
into a general theory of the gaseous tate, supplementing it with similar ideas 
concerning liquids. Morris holds that the germ of Lavoisier's early concept can 
be traced to the doctrine that 
fluid elasticity is not a property unique to air but is simply a state which 
other substances can assume solely onthe quantity of fire matter combined 
with them. 17 
In other words, Morris declares the theory about he states of matter to be 
the primary subject of Lavoisier's endeavours, whereas Guerlac takes these 
ideas as a mere by-product, designed to explain the heat from combustion as 
the release of caloric. 181 might also mention in passing that in Kohler's opinion 
it was the question of the constitution of acids that provoked Lavoisier to 
address the problem of combustion. 19The traditional view, moreover, egards 
the problem of weight increase in the calcination of metals as the main 
incentive for the formation of Lavoisier's theory. 2° Hankins, at last, refuses to 
label one problem as the origin of the oxygen theory. After listing the 
problems the theory was possibly intended to tackle, he confesses ignifi- 
cantly: 
We wilt never know exactly what combination of ideas and circumstances 
caused Lavoisier to undertake his research on combustion . . .2l 
If, following Zahar, one assumes that reconstructing the context of 
discovery isa necessary prerequisite for any methodological appraisal, then the 
problem of which data and experiments actually support Lavoisier's theory 
can only be solved after all doubt has been removed about he role each played 
in the genesis of the theory. Any account of the early stages in the 
development of Lavoisier's system provides its own set of supporting 
evidence. If one follows Guerlac and takes effervescence as the starting point, 
16 op.cit. , 106. 
17 Morris 1969, 376; italics n the original. 
~s Guerlac 1969, 382; this view is also held by Gough 1969, 267. 
~9 Kohler 1972, 349-355. 
2o This traditional interpretation is advocated by Berthelot 1890, for example; cf. Morris 1969, 
377. 
21 Hankins 1985, 98. 
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the release of a gas in metallic reductions cannot be accepted assupporting 
evidence. If the problem of weight is given precedence, the assessment is 
reversed. Any new approach to the origins of a theory causes a shift in 
methodological assessment. Zahar's combination of genetic and epistemologi- 
cal factors runs into problems because the origins of complex and comprehen- 
sive theories are extremely difficult to unveil. Yet it hardly seems appropriate 
to dispense with the methodological ssessment until agreement has been 
reached about the origins of important ideas. 
The difficulties arising over the applicability of Zahar's heuristic riterion 
recently provoked Michael Gardner to a coup de force. After discussing the 
pitfalls of the criterion he concludes: 
And in the end it seems to me that we are forced to adopt what is perhaps 
the simplest and most obvious criterion of novelty with respect to a given 
theory: not known to the person who constructed the theory at the time he 
did so?  
Gardner, however, is not very successful in his attempt to cut the Gordian 
knot. As far as personal novelty is concerned, one generally has to rely on the 
theory constructor's own word. His contemporaries certainly have hardly any 
other means at their disposal. Gardner tries to get around the problem of 
deception or general credibility by arguing that a scientist's professional ethos 
not only prevents him from fabricating experimental data but also from 
pretending that he was ignorant of a certain fact. 23 This analogy, however, is 
misleading. Whereas experiments can be repeated as a means of verifying their 
results, we generally have to rely on the scientist himself in order to assess 
what he knows. Reconstructing historically a scientist's general evel of 
knowledge means using techniques at least as esoteric as those needed to 
determine whether a certain fact has been used in theory-construction. 
Because Gardner's criterion makes methodological appraisal dependent on the 
knowledge of a scientist, it seems to imply that in the case of identical 
hypotheses made on the basis of same evidence, the less a scientist knows, the 
more praiseworthy his theory is. If one bears in mind that Lakatos's 
methodological theory is intended to be part of Poppers's world 3 and that it 
therefore deals with problems and theorems, and not with their status in the 
mind of the scientist, then the implications of Gardner's model should make it 
clear that things simply don't work this way. 
In 1978, John Worrall presented a more sophisticated version of Zahar's 
notion of a novel fact. He grants that methodological appraisal does depend on 
the approach to a theory, but he divests this approach of all personal factors. 
For Worrall the objective heuristic of a research programme, i. e. the research 
strategies associated with a programme, is what is important. What merits 
praise are no longer the origins of a hypothesis or the way an individual 
22 Gardner 1982, 10. 
23 op.cit., 11. 
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scientist arrives at his theory but the agreement between a theory and the 
heuristic of the respective research programme. 24 
In general it seems that recent work on the development of the MSRP is 
characterized by two general tendencies: (1) the attempt o develop an 
objective interpretation of the heuristic criterion for novel facts and (2) a 
greater degree of emphasis than in Lakatos on the positive heuristic. While 
Zahar's early writing occasionally conveyed the impression that an individual 
scientist's private associations and motives determine the value of his work, 
both he and Worrall subsequently try to eliminate all psychological overtones 
from the heuristic criterion. At stake is whether there are independent 
theoretical reasons for developing a hypothesis or whether it can be simply 
read off from the results. Worrall and Zahar, in other words, seek to establish 
clear-cut, i. e. objective and precise criteria for judging whether afact has been 
'used' in constructing a theory. This issue, however, has not yet been 
satisfactorily settled. A detailed account has only been developed for some 
individual cases uch as the adjustment ofparameters. 2  Those cases where the 
methodological ssessment could be guided by this definition, however, are 
not very common in the history of science. Nevertheless, the general direction 
is clear. The question is less the actual construction of a theory than its logical 
constructibility. What is important are not the facts which may have actually 
played a role in theory construction, but those which are indispensibte for its 
construction. Gerard Radnitzky has taken this final step towards an exclusi- 
vely logical version of the heuristic concept of support. He scrupulously 
avoids mixing the contexts of discovery and justification and re-establishes a 
strict separation between them. A fact cannot be used in support of a theory, if 
it is also required for the design of that theory. 26 
This logically neat variant of the heuristic riterion suffers from a lack of 
applicability in practice by allowing for methodological ppraisal only in 
limited cases. It seems rather plausible, on the one hand, that predicted, i. e. 
hitherto unknown facts are not necessary for theory construction. On the 
other hand, the adjustment of parameters indicates the inevitable reference to 
experimental results. The really interesting intermediate realm, however, 
remains untouched, leaving the problem of non-ad-hoc explanation of known 
facts unresolved. In advocating such a sterile logical version based on 
increasingly elaborate analysis of increasingly idealized cases the MSRP runs 
the risk of losing touch with scientific practice. It risks abdicating its role as the 
key to methodological ppraisal. Ranging from psychological relativism to 
24 Worrall 1978a, 51, 59-60; 1978b, 325; this criterion is also foreshadowed in Whewell's 
writings. The adequacy of auxiliary hypotheses should be judged by considering the progress of 
theories. In true theories "all additional suppositions tend to simplicity and harmony. . ,  we have 
thus a constant convergence to unity. In false theories, the contrary is the case. The new 
suppositions are something altogether additional; - not suggested by the original scheme; perhaps 
difficult to reconcile with it" (Whewell in Butts 1968, 155 italics in the original). 
25 Worrall 1978b, 325; cf. also Zahar's explanation of Planck's analysis of Kaufmann's 
experiment; Zahar 1978, 71-97. 
26 Radnitzky 1979, 242-244. 
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inapplicable logicism, all versions of the heuristic criterion appear equally 
unattractive. 
The second tendency peculiar to the development of the MSRP was the 
increasing emphasis placed on the heuristic power of a programme. In 1971, in 
response to Noretta Koertge's objections 27, Lakatos conceded that greater 
heuristic power may constitute the a-priori superiority of a programme prior 
to all empirical tests. 28 Similarly, Zahar sought he rationale of Planck's and 
Minkowski's early conversion to Einstein's relativity programme in relativity 
theory's superior heuristic power, although up to that point the theory's 
potential had not led to confirmed predictions or to novel facts in Zahar's 
sense. 29 Worrall goes even farther by placing the criterion of heuristic power 
on the same level with the progress or degeneracy of a programme. 3° In the 
face of such developments, however, I cannot refrain from advancing some 
reservations. Kuhn has pointed out that the possible conflict between several 
epistemological standards of equal status rules out an unequivocal ssessment 
of a proposed hypothesis. Thus a theol T can exhibit high conformity to the 
facts while at the same time contradicting other well-approved and experimen- 
tally confirmed views. On the other hand, a theory may display great fertility 
but suffer from conceptual inconsistencies. Kuhn regards this problem as one 
source of the possible incommensurability between two theories or para- 
digms. 31 In my opinion, one of the primary merits of Lakatos's methodology 
is his replacement of the traditional mukitude of contrasting or even, 
conflicting methodological demands with a single, precise, and sophisticated 
criterion of fertility, supplemented by empirical demands. This avoids Kuhn's 
problem. Reintroducing a number of possibly conflicting yardsticks for 
methodological ppraisal means that none of the competing theories can be 
unambiguously assessed methodologically, not even in retrospect. Methodo- 
logy can do nothing but shrug its shoulders and suspend judgement. This is 
certainly no recommendation for philosophy of science. 
Unfortunately, the criterion of heuristic power also appears rather unpre- 
cise. Worrall appraises the heuristic of Ptolemy's programme as weak, because 
one had to wait for the occurrence of anomalies and was not able to foresee 
them32; Musgrave thinks it was strong because it almost provided an algorithm 
for the solution of observed anomalies. 33But even assuming that the concept 
of heuristic power could be rendered precise, it seems insufficient to use the 
promise of theoretically progressive problem shifts (and nothing else is offered 
by a powerful programme heuristic) as the acceptance criterion of a pro- 
gramme. The promise of success, even if it is well-founded, is alone not a 
sufficient criterion for the adoption of a theory-. 
27 Koertge 1971, 160-173. 
28 Lakatos 1971b, 176. 
29 Zahar 1973, 241. 
3o Worrall 1978a, 63-64. 
31 Kuhn 1977, 320-339. 
32 Worrall 1978a, 60. 
33 Musgrave 1978, Nora ~ ~' -  
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A more promising approach is suggested by Larry Laudan's distinction 
between criteria of acceptance and criteria of pursuit. In modifying Laudan's 
approach, I propose to take empirical progress as the rationale for accepting a 
programme, or at least one of its stages, and the power of heuristic as a good 
reason for pursuing it further. This distinction helps to clarify the kind of 
competition between phenomenological and atomic-kinetic thermodynamics. 
According to Peter Clark, the heuristic was weak in the former but strong in 
the latter. On the other hand, whereas phenomenological theory made 
advances in the last decades of the 19th century, statistical theory degenera- 
ted24 One would expect in such a situation that the phenomenological theory 
was being accepted and the other abandoned. But at the same time, attempts 
should have been made to overcome the phenomenological theory and further 
kinetics. This is precisely what happened. Heuristic power, taken as criterion 
of pursuit, rationalizes the attempts to transcend phenomenological thermo- 
dynamics and explains why the kinetic tradition survived as an undercurrent 
rather than being rejected outright. Interpreting events in this way, however, 
leads to very different conclusions than those reached by Laudan. Laudan 
considers that the rate of increase of the theory's 'problems-solving effective- 
ness' establishes the rationality of pursuit 3s, whereas I hold the development of 
fruitful lines of research to be of decisive importance in this matter. The 
implication here is that a programme is worth pursuing when it raises many 
new and interesting problems and thus promises novel insights. Laudan's 
criterion, on the contrary, disregards uch a phenomenon because it dimin- 
ishes problem solving effectiveness. 
II. THE PROPOSAL 
Is it all possible to develop a viable criterion of acceptance, if we reject a 
heuristic criterion of acceptance because it seems to over-estimate the 
importance of conceptual guidelines in methodological assessment or because, 
as in the versions we have examined, it is caught between the scylla of 
psychological relativism and the charybdis of logically disinfected inapplicabi- 
lity? In 1974, Alan Musgrave suggested that since Lakatos's methodology 
deals with competing theories, it would be reasonable to count as supporting 
evidence the explanation of those facts which are prohibited or at least 
improbable in the light of the best rival theory available. 36 'Novel', in 
Musgrave's ense, no longer implies that a fact is prohibited by the entire 
background knowledge or that it was previously unknown to science. His 
notion of novelty refers instead to facts which could not have been expected 
from the best rival theory available. Such a criterion exalts the explanation f 
facts which conflict with the competing account or which cannot be otherwise 
34 Clark 1976, 75-91. 
35 Laudan 1977. 111; for Laudan "the overall problem-solving effectiveness of a theory is 
determined by assessing the number and importance o~ the empirical problems which the theory 
solves and deducting therefrom the number and importance of the anomalies and conceptual 
problems which the theory generates" (op.cit., 68). 
36 Musgrave 1974, 15-23; 1978, 182-186, Note 17. 
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explained. Furthermore, it permits the extension of a theory into realms of 
reality about which the adversary theory had nothing to say. Musgrave's 
approach thus rewards the explanatory achievements of a theory and considers 
the explanation of already known results to be such an intricate task that it is 
difficult to complete it satisfactorily. A strict predictivism regards accounting 
for known facts as a mere prerequisite otaking part in the essential "chase after 
predictions'. By focusing on anomalies, Musgrave redirects the MSRP into a 
more Popperian track. Anomalies hould be taken more seriously than they 
are by Lakatos. Lakatos's scientist has such nonchalant confidence in his 
positive heuristic hat he refuses to indulge in observations, and "wilt lie down 
on his couch, shut his eyes and forget about the data". 37 According to 
Musgrave's approach, a theory is supported by all the facts that it explains, 
whereas the best rival theory available fails to account for them, regardless of 
whether these facts were previously known or the theory was designed for 
their explanation. 
Musgrave's theoretical concept of support seems to be slightly ambiguous. 
The  notion of the 'best rival theory available' may refer on the one hand to the 
immediate precursor within the same programme. In this case, the support of 
the current version of a programme is compared to the most recent one. On 
the other hand, Musgrave's approach may compare the respective achieve- 
ments of two rival programmes, thus expressing the support of the entire 
programme compared to its competitor. I will speak of intra-programme 
support in the first case and of inter-programme support in the second one. 
Worall criticised Musgrave's view by claiming that it fails to solve the 
problem of ad hoc explanations. Let a fact e be discovered independently of 
two rival theories T1 and T2 and let them both be incapable of explaining e. The 
protagonists of TI and T 2 may now easily produce a slightly modified version 
of their respective approaches so as to account for the difficulty. Which theory 
is actually supported by e depends olely on which one first succeeded in 
explaining the intricacy. If, for example, the adherents of TI propose hastily 
TI' which is in fact nothing else but a conjunction of T1 and e, then e supports 
TI' and henceforth cannot support any version of T2. 
Any theory no matter how 'cooked-up' can, on this theoretical view, gain 
support from the facts so long as it is the first to explain them. 38 
Worrall's objection holds. The theoretical criterion can only be maintained if 
one requires qualified anomaly solutions, i.e. if one sets forth criteria to 
exclude ad hoc explanations. One should neither dispute the methodological 
importance of anomaly solutions nor admit anomaly solutions indiscrimina- 
tely. The neglect of the second aspect constitutes the weakness in Musgrave's 
version of the theoretical criterion. 
The same fault is present in Richard Nunan's approach. Nunan recently 
37 Lakatos 1970, 50. 
38 Worrall 1978b, 331; Worrall's objection virtually relies on Watkins's antitrivialization 
principle: "any philosophical ccount of scientific progress must be inadequate if it has the (no 
doubt unintended) implication that it is always trivially easy to make theoretical progress in 
science" (Watkins 1984, 166; partly italicized in the original). 
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'warmed up' the inter-programme version of Musgrave's criterion, According 
to him, a fact 
is novel with respect to a given hypothesis f it has not already been used in 
support of, or cannot readily be explained in terms of, a hypothesis 
entertained in some rival research program. 39 
But Nunan, like Musgrave, does not sufficiently consider the problem of ad 
hoc explanations. He seems to associate ad-hoc-ness in some way with 
heuristic incoherencies, but gives no details. 4° Likewise, if the reference to 
'readily explained facts' i  intended to exclude ad hoc accounts, some less 
cryptic hints are required. If scientists could reach an inter-programme 
agreement concerning the methodological requirements anexplanation has to 
meet in order to be regarded as scientific or acceptable, Nunan's failure to 
tackle that problem Would be insignificant. But this is hardly- the case. 
Structural chemistry sought o explain the cohesion of bodies by assuming the 
existence of particular particle figures -which, by fitting together, cause 
particles stick to each other mechanically. This explanation is no longer 
accepted by Newton. He states: 
And for explaining how [cohesion] may be some have invented hooked 
atoms, which is begging the Question. 41 
On the other hand, the Leibniz-Clarke-correspondence provides ample 
evidence that Leibniz regarded the Newtonian explanation in terms of 
universal attraction as no explanation at all. We are at a loss how to apply 
Nunan's criterion in such cases of programme dependent and therefore variant 
standards for explanations, cases where the protagonists of one programme 
claim to have readily explained a fact whereas the opponents dispute this claim. 
This failure is due to Nunan's neglect to specify methodological requirements 
for a scientific explanation. Only by establishing such requirements would it 
be possible to weigh and to judge with hindsight the variant claims entertained 
by both sides. 
What could such methodological standards be like? Lakatos seeks to 
preclude ad hoc adaptations by stating that: "A given fact is explained 
scientifically only ira new fact is also explained with it. ''42 In another passage 
he indicates that those facts are to be considered novel which are improbable in
the light of or even forbidden by a rival theory. 43 We cannot ignore that 
Lakatos ometimes advocated  strict predictivism and that he was occasionally 
inclined to take a mere novel explanation of known facts as supporting 
evidence. Nevertheless, Lakatos's writings also seem to provide a foundation 
for the further development of the theoretical riterion. I would like to argue 
that we should consider a hypothesis as explaining a fact in a non-ad-hoc 
manner if the very same hypothesis explains at least another independent fac  
which either constitutes an omaly for the rival theory or falls beyond i ts  
39 Nunan 1984, 279. 
40 see ibid., 285, 291. 
41 Newton 1730, 388. 
42 Lakatos 1970, 34. 
43 ibid., 32. 
216 Martin Carrier 
realm of application, i. e. which is neither derivable from nor inconsistent with 
the competing approach. The value of genuine predictions is an immediate 
consequence of this version of the theoretical criterion. Successfully predicted 
facts generally were not expected on the basis of the competitor. Naturally, the 
competitor is also invited to account for the difficulty thus created, but the 
advantage achieved by the rival can only be compensated for if the competitor 
explains asecond anomaly or extends its realm of application. In other words, 
a theory derives upport from its excess content, i. e. the explanation of those 
facts the rival theory cannot explain regardless of whether they were 
previously known. 
Newton's mechanical theory, for example, explained Galileo's and Kepler's 
laws. Bohr's atomic model not only solved the stability problem of the 
hydrogen atom, but also accounted for the hydrogen spectrum. The prediction 
of Neptune's existence not only reconciled Newtonian theory with the 
apparently irregular movement of the other planets, but also allowed for the 
prediction of the regular movement of a new astronomical body (i. e. 
Neptune). Einsteins's theory of General Relativity not only accounted for the 
anomalous rotation of the Mercury perihelion but predicted in addition avalue 
for the bending of light rays in the sun's gravitational field. On the other hand, 
when Maxwell replaced the atomic model of elastic spheres with a conception 
of atoms as centres of force, he cleared up the unexpected proportionality of
viscosity and temperature but nothing else. 44 In other words, Maxwelt's 
explanation was dhoc. 
Of course, ad-hoc-ness does not necessarily have to be a lasting or, as it 
were, fateful property of a hypothesis. It may well be the case that the full 
implications of a theory for experimental research are not recognized when the 
theory is formulated but only at a later stage. In addition, the refinement of 
other theories may entail new inter-theoretic relations and laws which allow 
for the deduction of observable implications of the hypothesis in question. For 
these reasons, I suggest to distinguish between the two following cases: 
No independently testable implications are known (ad hocl). No such 
implications have been actually confirmed (a hoc2). Characterizing a hypo- 
thesis as being ad hoc l  or  ad hoc2 is, therefore, time-dependent. 45 
44 See Clark 1976, 54. 
45 Methodological literature provides us with a vast number of conditions for the ad-hoc-ness 
of a hypothesis. Apart from the concepts already discussed (i.e. apart from the predictivistic and 
the post-Lakatos versions of the heuristic riterion) I am aware of no less than eight different 
notions of ad-hoc-ness (and I do not, of course, pretend to know them all). 
(1) No excess empirical content or no independent testable consequences actually exist (Lakatos 
1971a, 112; Griinbaum 1976, 337). 
(2) No such consequences are known (Lakatos 1971a, 112; Griinbaum 1976, 336). 
(3) No such consequences are confirmed (Zahar 1973, 101; Gr~inbaum 1976, 334). 
(4) All such consequences are empirically refuted (Lakatos 1971a, 112). 
(5) It is assumed that a hypothesis is independently testable, but it is further assumed 
(motivated by the claims of some rival theory) that the hypothesis will fail in subsequent 
experimental tests (Griinbaum 1973, 717). 
(6) The hypothesis empirically ad hoc in the senses (t) or (2) or (3) and has furthermore no 
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What we now need is a criterion for determining single facts. This 
separation problem constitutes a notorious difficulty for any account which 
relies on some sort of 'independent testability' for characterizing non-ad-hoc 
explanations. Hempel suspects that a logically sharp criterion for distinguish- 
ing between different facts does not exist at all. To clarify the notion of an 
'independent consequence' it is necessary instead to refer to pragmatic notions 
such as 'significantly' or 'interestingly' different observational consequences. 46 
I want to propose a solution to the separation problem based on the concept of 
low-level empirical generalization. As described above, a 'fact' in the 
methodologically relevant sense is not to be considered as a singular statement 
about something happening at a certain place and time. A fact should be 
regarded instead as an empirical regularity which occurs repeatedly if certain 
circumstances are realized. If one bears in mind that the assessment criterion 
presented requires that a hypothesis olves at least two anomalies, then the 
empirical generalizations should be identified with the 'facts" to be explained. 
One only has to ask oneself what could possibly constitute an anomaly for or 
an extension of a theory. Certainly not a singular statement about a curious 
event. Only if such a curiosity is reproducible does it become more than afeu 
follet. 
If we agree that facts are to be understood as empirical generalizations, the 
next question is: What constitutes a 'single' empirical generalization? A
promising answer seems to be: A "single fact' is a law-like relation between 
two variables that are observationally or experimentally detectable. Boyle's 
law (p V -- constant), for example, expresses such a relation between pressure 
and volume, viz. between two experimentally susceptible parameters. In other 
words, Boyle's law constitutes a single fact. It is important o realize that an 
empirical generalization of such a kind in addition to the explicitly stated 
regularity also (tacitly) contains a ceteris-paribus-clause in the form: either 
there do not exist any further variables which might influence the experimental 
outcome or such variables are kept constant. In the case of Boyle's law the 
ceteris-paribus-clause is only valid if no temperature changes occur. In other 
words, an empirical law-like generalization entails the claim that unless 
explicitly stated otherwise no further variables are influential on the experi- 
mental outcome. Without such a ceteris-paribus-clause an empirical aw does 
in fact not state anything, because very unexpected, anomalous result can be 
attributed to the presence of an unknown influence. In order to make testing at 
all possible, it is necessary to understand an empirical law as the conjunction of 
the explicitly stated relation and a ceteris-paribus-clause. The empirical 
theoretical plausibility or sanction (Griinbaum 1976, 333-337). 
(7) There are confirmed consequences but the hypothesis is not in accordance with the 
heuristic of a research programme (Lakatos's 'ad hoc3') (Lakatos 197Ia, 112). In other words, 
concept (6) holds theoretical plausibility to be a sufJ~cient condition for non-ad-hoc-ness, concept 
(7) views it as a necessary one. 
(8) A necessary condition for an ad hoc hypothesis is its 'non-fundamentality'; it fails to go to 
the heart of the matter' (Leplin 1982, 237). 
46 cf. Griinbaum 1976, 350. 
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detection of an additional parameter that influences the experimental result 
(provided that this influence is of law-like fashion) therefore constitutes an 
additional fact. The ideal gas law p • V = R. T, for example, entails Boyle's law 
if the temperature T is constant, and introduces an additional temperature- 
dependance. That is, it implies in addition alaw-like relation between pressure 
and temperature and between volume and temperature. Each of these two- 
parameter-relations is (with the proviso of the ceteris-paribus-clause) experi- 
mentally testable and indeed valid. The ideal gas law therefore mbodies three 
facts. 47 
In order to clarify the separation criterion let me apply it to the empirical 
support of Torricelli's 'air-pressure hypothesis'. Torricelli's new idea was that 
we all live at the bottom of a vast "sea of air'. Because of its weight he air exerts 
a pressure upon all things on the surface of the earth. This new conception 
eventually supplanted the old horror-vacui theory, according to which nature 
abhors the void. By means of this hypothesis Torricelli was able not only to 
explain the notorious uction pump anomaly, that is, the formerly mysterious 
fact that such devices failed to pump water higher than about ten m ters, but 
also to predict a relation between the specific weight of the liquid used in a 
'barometer' and the height to which it rised. He tested his prediction by 
replacing water with mercury and indeed confirmed that the ratio of the height 
of climb of the mercury column to the height of a water column was equivalent 
to the ratio of their specific weights. A second prediction is entailed by 
Torricelli's hypothesis. There should exist a relation between the height of 
climb of a liquid column and the height above sea-level. On high mountains, 
for example, the weight of the air above, which balances the weight of the 
liquid, is smaller than at sea-level. This results in a reduced height of climb of 
the liquid column. This second prediction was verified in the famous Puy-de- 
D6me experiment induced by Pascal. 
According to the proposed criterion for the separation of facts, all the three 
regularities constitute different facts. First, there was an explanation of an 
enigmatic failure in the functioning of pumping devices which had not been 
previously accounted for. In other words, Torricelli explained how the 
formerly mysterious failure in the regular functioning of suction pumps 
depended on the height to which the water was to be raised. Secondly he 
predicted a relation between the ight of climb and the specific weight of the 
liquid used. Thirdly, his hypothesis mplied a causal relationship between the 
height o which a liquid rised and the height above sea-level. 
It is important to distinguish clearly between the empirical problem of the 
verification of a two-parameter-relation, that is the problem of establishing the 
facts, and the methodological problem of assessing the quality of an 
explanation of these facts. One can indeed question whether the relation 
Torricelli established between height of climb and specific weights is really 
47 Matters would be different if a set of two-parameter relations implied a further two- 
parameter r lation. The logical consequences of experimental laws must not count themselves as 
separate laws. 
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sufficiently tested by an experiment involving only two substances. Further 
experiments with other liquids, however, do not constitute separate facts 
themselves, but only test whether one fact really proves correct. The same holds 
for the Puy-de-D6me case. The repetition of this experiment on other 
mountains or even in areas below sea-level serves only to establish one fact. 
These considerations i dicate that we have to distinguish between the 
methodological problems involved in the concept of the 'sufficient' empirical 
confirmation offacts (i. e. low-level empirical generalizations) and the notion of 
'sufficient" explanatory power of higher level hypotheses. 48 In this paper, only 
the second aspect is treated. For the methodological point of view adopted here, 
an empirical regularity is not an explanans, but an explanadum. 
III. THE APPLICATION 
Since a theory is best understood when it is put into practice, I want to discuss 
two examples of applying the assessment and separation criteria. In order to 
illustrate the two criteria I have chosen affinity theory, a research programme in
18th century chemistry, and the notoriously problematic ad hoc character of 
Lorentz's contraction hypothesis. 
Let me first sketch L. B. Guyton de Morveau's contributions to the affinity 
programme so as to appraise them subsequently in the light of the criteria 
presented above. 
In the 18th century the dominant view about the origins of the chemical 
behaviour of substances assumed the existence of interparticulate forces or 
affinities. These forces were supposed to act electively, i. e. to be specific to each 
pair of substances, and to remain constant regardless of factors such as 
temperature or the quantity of the substances employed. The order in which 
substances precipitate each other out of solutions indicates the order of affinity. 
If, for example, terra ponderosa pura (BA(OH)2) is added to a solution of 
vitriolated tartar (K2(SO4), heavy spar (BaSO4) precipitates, leaving aresidue of 
caustic potash (KOH) [Ba(OH)2 + 2 K2SO4 --~ BaSO4 + 2 KOH]. The common 
interpretation f this reaction at the time was that terra ponderosa pura displays 
a greater affinity to vitriolic acid than to caustic potash. 49 Beginning in the 1770s 
one of the foremost aims of the affinity theory was to express the basic concept 
of elective attractions numerically, i.e. to transform the qualitative order, 
known through the precipitation reactions, into a quantitative s ries indicating 
the strength of the interparticulate forces. In 1775, Guyton began a series of 
experiments designed to achieve this aim. He tried to base the measurement of 
affinities upon the measurement of adhesions. He then determined the adhesive 
strength by measuring the force required to detach little metallic discs from the 
surface of liquids after controlling for their weight. 
48 Hempel makes a roughly analogous distinction. He distinguishes between 'explanation- 
seeking questions' and 'reason-seeking or epistemic' questions. Whereas the first type of question 
concerns the reasons why something happened, the second type refers to the reasons that something 
happened (Hempel 1965, 334-335). 
49 Bergman 1775, 28-32. 
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Guyton began his set of experiments by attacking the view that adhesion 
was not an effect of chemical forces but was instead brought about by 
atmospheric pressure. He determined the forces necessary to detach a glass 
disc from the surfaces of different liquids at constant pressure and found the 
nature of the liquid to be a significant factor. Moreover, he also demonstrated 
that a disc still cleaved to mercury in a vacuum. After having established the 
chemical origin of adhesion in this way, Guyton extended his experiments to
discs of tallow. Since their adhesion to several aqueous olutions proved to be 
stronger than that of glass discs, Guyton assumed that an attractive force 
existed between fat and water and not, as was generally assumed, a repulsive 
one. In a similar way he also demonstrated the existence of an attraction 
between glass and merc-ury, s°
After these preliminary examinations Guyton began the second phase of his 
experiments: measuring affinities in terms of adhesion. He placed different 
metallic discs of equal size, i. e. of equal active area, on mercury and measured 
the force required to separate them. The order of affinity turned out to be 
equivalent to the order of adhesive strength. In other words, the succession f 
substances in the apparently physical property of adhesion coincided with the 
order in chemical attraction, i. e. with the order in which the different metals 
precipitated and replaced each other in solutions in mercury. For Guyton 
these results proved beyond any doubt that adhesion and affinity rested on a 
common foundation, s~ After successfully reproducing the qualitative affinity 
series via a quantitative determination f adhesion, Guyton concluded that the 
force of adhesion was a quantitative measure of affinity strength. 
How should we evaluate Guyton's conclusions? First, it should be 
mentioned that Guyton was a fervent Buffonian. Buffon, in his mammoth 
Histoire naturelle, had advocated the view that all forces of inanimate nature, 
affinities explicitly included, can be traced back to gravitation. The seemingly 
increased strength of chemical as compared to gravitational ttraction is due in 
reality to the small interparticulate distances. Furthermore, the dependance of 
chemical action on the nature of the chemical substances can be explained by 
taking into account he different shapes or forms of the ultimate particles, 2 
Guyton's procedure for measuring affinities appears to be an MSRP success 
sto W for Buffonianism. From his basic Buffonian conviction Guyton deduced 
that 
a) only one single force is active in all chemical processes and that 
b) this force is attractive. 
He concluded that if adhesive forces are not the resu]t of physical 
circumstances, i.e. atmospheric pressure, but of chemical origin, then these 
forces must be identical to the forces responsible for solution, i.e. affinities. 
This conclusion led to the first claim: the order of the strength of adhesive 
forces is identical to the order of affinities. His second claim was closely 
so cf. Smeaton 1963, 61-62. 
s~ Guyton 1786, 467. 
5z Buffon 1770, 1-10; 1774a, 1-36; 1774b, 57-64. 
On Novel Facts 221 
related to the first: all facts which seemingly militate against he operation f
attractive forces, e.g. the insolubility of fat in water or the downward bent 
surface of mercury in glass-tubes, facts that were generally explained on the 
assumption of repulsive forces, must on closer inspection turn out to be the 
result of the action of attractive forces. Guyton succeeded in confirming both 
claims. 
If the proposed assessment criterion is taken as the basis of judgement, 
Guyton's experiments can be regarded as supporting a Buffonian position. 
Guyton arrived at two novel explanations of phenomena that were not 
previously explained within the Buffonian programme but rather constituted 
anomalies for it. One suspects, however, that Guyton needed two hypotheses 
to arrive at two explanations so that each hypothesis falls short of the 
requirements of the assessment criterion. I will treat the problem of the 
individuation of hypotheses more systematically in the next section, but in this 
case matters eem rather clear. If we agree that empirical regularities contain a 
ceteris-paribus-clause, w  can also admit the same in the case of explaining 
hypotheses. In other words, an explaining hypothesis tacitly entails the claim 
that unless otherwise stated the relation between the empirical or theoretical 
quantities it expresses i the only relevant relation between these quantities. 
Put this way Guyton's hypothesis (a) is just the explicitly stated ceteris- 
paribus-clause of hypothesis (b). This leads to the conclusion that both 
assumptions actually constitute one hypothesis. 
But the story does not end here. At this point Guyton had to ask himself 
whether precipitations can be explained if the action of repulsive forces is 
excluded ? He proposed atheory of solutions 53 according to which a substance 
is soluble in a solvent if the particle density of the solvent and the dissolved 
substance are approximately equal. If this condition of equiponderance is 
violated, precipitation occurs as a direct consequence of the difference in 
specific weight. The apparent repulsion in precipitation processes i in reality 
just a result of gravitational ttraction. Thus oil does not dissolve in water 
because of the unequal densities of the two materials. This leads to the 
following claim: if one employs a solvent less dense than water, spirit of wine 
(alcohol) for example, oil ought to dissolve in it. Since this proved to be the 
case, it constituted the first intra-programme extension effected by the theory 
of solutions. A second consequence was that the precipitation of a previously 
dissolved substance occurs when the density of the solvent is diminished. In 
fact, adding spirit of wine to an aqueous aline solution orwater to a solution 
of bismuth in nitric acid had precisely the expected effect. 
Applying the separation criterion shows, however, that both facts cannot be 
labeled as 'independent'. They are both empirical instances of the very same 
empirical regularity, namely the claimed relation between the specific weights 
of solving and solved substances. It is wholly irrelevant for this issue that in 
one case the product is a solution and in the other one a precipitation. This 
diversity only concerns the credibility of Guyton's empirical claim and does 
53 For Guyton's theory of solutions ee Smeaton 1963, 58. 
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not express eparate facts. In other words, Guyton's theory of solution is not 
endorsed by the assessment criterion. 
A much debated problem in the philosophy of science is the ad-hoc-ness of 
Lorentz's contraction hypothesis. This problem is generally discussed in terms 
of the difference between the Michelson-Morley-experiment (MME), which 
led to the formulation of the hypothesis, and the Kennedy-Thorndike- 
experiment (KTE). It is usually asked whether MME and KTE are different in 
kind, so that a positive outcome of the KTE would have supported Lorentz's 
electron theory. Gr/inbaum advocates the View that both experiments are of 
different kind and that because of this the KTE is an independent test for 
Lorentz's contraction hypothesis. 54 Lepli n, on the other hand, is more 
cautious on this point. 
Was the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment, for example, sufficiently different 
from the Michelson-Morley experiment to constitute an independent test of 
CH [contraction hypothesis].. .  ? No general principle of individnation for 
experimental types is available to decide such cases. 55 
Leplin, therefore, suspends his judgement. Let us look where the criterion 
proposed here leads us to. 
As is well known, in the year 1881 Michelson (together with changing 
collaborators) began a series of experiments to verify the existence of an 'aether 
drift' caused by the relative motion of the earth through the aether. According 
to the aether theory, the speed of light is constant relative to the aether, i. e. to 
the system at absolute rest. Relative to an observer moving with respect to the 
aether, however, the measured velocity of light should depend on the 
observer's tate of motion, according to Galileo's law of the addition of 
velocities. The (two-way) speed of light can be measured by reflecting a light 
signal off a mirror (at known distance) back to the origin and recording the 
elapsed time between emission and return. According to the aether theory, 
such a light signal should have different velocities if it is emitted in the 
direction of the earth's motion through the aether or perpendicular to it. 
Michelson devised his experiment to detect his effect. He used an interfero- 
meter with two perpendicular ms of equal length. If two light signals are 
emitted at the same time, one in the direction of the earth's motion and one 
perpendicular to it, both should need a different ime for travelling along a 
path of equal lengthl This time difference should be traceable by interference 
effects, s6 As no such effects occurred, Lorentz designed his contraction 
hypothesis, according to which the motion of a body through the aether leads 
to a contraction of this body in the direction of its motion. The contraction 
factor (1 - v2/c2) I/2 was such that the shortening of the one arm of the 
interferometer exactly compensated for the difference in the travel time of both 
light rays. Lorentz's theory led to the following general expression for the time 
difference in such interference experiments: 
54 Griinbaum 1976, 349-350. 
5s Leplin 1982, 244. 
56 For the details compare French 1971, 49-55; Born 1920, 185-188. 
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2 (110 - 120) [1 v2 t-1/2 At ( .p ,  
c - 7 /  
110 and 120 are the respective lengths of the interferometer a ms when 
unaffected by the motion through the aether, c is the speed of light in the 
aether system, v the velocity of the earth relative to the aether. In the case 110 = 
120 (MME), At reduces to zero, in accordance tothe Michelson-Morley result. 
In the case of the interferometer arms having different lengths, however, there 
should, on the Lorentz account, occur a time difference with corresponding 
interference effects. The KTE of 1932 was undertaken to test whether these 
effects actually occurred. Again, the answer was negative.SS 
Beginning, probably, with Poincar~'s acid-tongued remarks on the poor 
appearance of Lorentz's electron theory sg, the methodological ssessment of
the contraction hypothesis has been subject to extensive debate in the 
philosophy of science. On the basis of the heuristic riterion for the novelty of 
facts, Zahar claims that the Lorentz contraction hypothesis was not ad hoc 
because it was suggested by the heuristic of Lorentz's programme. Lorentz, 
according tO Zahar, derived the contraction hypothesis from a more funda- 
mental theory, the 'Molecular Forces Hypothesis' (Zahar's term), which states 
that molecular forces behave and transform like electromagnetic forces. The 
origin of this hypothesis had nothing to do with the MME. Zahar concludes: 
My claim is that the [contraction hypothesis] is non ad hoc, and that 
Michelson's resu l t . . ,  supported [Lorentz's programme]. 6° 
The validity of Zahr's claim is denied by Kenneth Schaffner. He concedes 
that the molecular forces hypothesis actually suggested the contraction 
hypothesis, but argues that this hypothesis was itself ad hoc in the heuristic 
sense. 6lThis discussion indicates once more the validity of the inapplicability 
objection made in the first section with respect to the heuristic riterion. 
Relying on the independent testability criterion Griinbaum claims that the 
contraction hypothesis was not ad hoc because the KTE provides an 
independent test of this hypothesis. The contraction hypothesis, therefore, 
actually possessed independent falsifiable consequences and it was in fact 
s7 French 1971, 62. 
s8 In fact, apart from the different arm lengths, a second istinction exists between MME und 
KTE. The MME only tested the isotropy of the velocity of light, within one  inertial system, 
whereas the KTE compared the velocities of light between several inertial system, moving with 
different velocities with respect to the aether (cf. French 1971, 71). In the following discussion, 
this second aspect is left out of consideration because it introduces no novel methodological 
aspects. 
s9 Poincar~ 1902, 182. 
6o Zahar 1973, 107. 
61 Schaffner 1974, 49-53. 
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falsified by the negative outcome of the KTE. 62 Popper 63 and Zahar 64 agree. 
According to this account, MME and KTE were of different kind, so that a 
positive result of the latter would have supported Lorentz's theory. 
How can we appraise this situation in terms of the proposed assessment and 
separation criteria? We first have to ask whether the contraction hypothesis 
was ad hoc. A look at equation (*) reveals that i t  was  not .  The contraction 
hypothesis predicts two  experimentally susceptible two-parameter relations. 
One between the transit time difference of the light rays and the relative 
velocity of the earth through the aether and a second one between the same 
time difference and the difference in the interferometer arm lengths. To put it 
more precisely, the application of the separation and assessment criterion 
taken together leads to the conclusion that Lorentz's hypothesis was never ad 
hoct. This implies the appraisal that the contraction hypothesis had the chance 
of becoming an acceptable explanation. Matters ran different and so it failed 
(i. e. it never lost its ad hoc2 status). But it is important to realize that it failed 
for empirical and not for methodological reasons. 
This appraisal is quite independent of any claim about a possible difference 
between MME and KTE. In fact, no such criterion for the individuation of 
types of experiments had been proposed up to this point. But it is appropriate 
to regard those experiments a being of the same kind which serve to establish 
the same fact, i. e. that test the same empirical relation(s). On this proposal, 
MME and KTE are of same kind, because both were designed to test equation 
(*). It is of no relevance whatever in this context that the KTE was much better 
suited for this purpose than the MME because the range of data recorded was 
much greater. In fact, the latter was rather poorly designed as a test of equation 
(*) because it only examined the degenerate case 110 = 120. But considerations of 
that kind only refer to the first level of methodological assessment mentioned 
above. They deal with the question how reliably the facts are established. But 
they do not influence the methodological virtues of the explanatory hypoth- 
eses itself. 
Concerning the problem of singling out one type of experiment, an 
additional difficulty emerges. What about an experiment of MM- or KT-type 
that is designed to test a possible material-dependance of the contraction. 65 
And what about the difference between the Miller experiment, which was 
exactly analogous to the MME apart from that it employed a light path of 64 
meters, and the original MME, where the light path had the length of only 11 
meters. 66 To clarify such cases one has to bear in mind that any empirical 
generalization e tails a creterisparibus-clanse. In other words, it is assumed 
that all relevant parameters are under experimental control, i. e. that there exist 
62 Grfinbaum 1976, 388; Griinbaum emphasizes that a falsification of the contraction 
hypothesis tself could always be avoided by shifting the blame to other auxiliary assumptions; cf. 
ibid. and also Griinbaum 1973, 715-725. 
63 Popper 1934, 51. 
64 Zahar t973, 104. 
6s Such an experiment was actually conducted by Michelson; cf. Lakatos 1970, 76. 
66 This question puzzles Grfinbaum; cf. Griinbaum 1976, 349. 
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no additional relevant influences. Obviously, experiments a those described 
above test this ceteris-paribus-clause. That is to say, if they lead to expected 
results, i. e. if they confirm the clause, they do not give rise to a separate fact, 
since - as stated above - the ceteris-paribus-clause is to be considered as part of 
the pertinent fact. Matters are quite different, however, if it is discovered that 
the experimental outcome is unexpectedly altered by the variation of the 
quantity under consideration. This means the introduction f a new empirical 
relation and consequently the establishment of a new fact. In other words, as 
long as the variations in the experimental conditions do not lead to the 
detection of empirical regularities, (i. e. if they only serve to increase, for 
example, the accuracy of the experiment) i  remains the same experiment. 
To conclude, Lorentz's theory cannot be held responsible for explaining the 
MME in an ad hoc manner. At most, Lorentzians can be blamed for not 
having sufficiently tested the explaining hypothesis. This conclusion indicates 
that the superiority of Einstein's pecial theory should not be grounded by 
reference to the ad-hoc-ness of the contraction hypothesis (or similar 
methodological b unders). 67The methodological justification of Einstein's 
approach must be achieved by different means. I think that the methodological 
criterion of maximum explanatory power, i. e. the requirement that a theory 
should use a minimum set of fundamental postulates o as to explain a 
maximum range of phenomena with maximum precision, might be the 
adequate means for this purpose. 
IV. SOME FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS 
Obviously, a criterion for determining a 'single fact" does only half the job. 
What is also needed is a criterion for the individuation of hypotheses. Often it 
is possible to express one hypothesis as a conjunction of several ones or to join 
67 It is appropriate to underline this conclusion by two further emarks. 
It should be noted, first, that even the negative outcome of the KTE could have well been 
digested within Lorentz's theory. If one adds a time dilation hypothesis to Lorentz's theory, this 
doubly amended aether account implies the Kennedy-Thorndike null result. Furthermore, the 
conjunction of contraction and time dilation hypotheses - besides rescuing the theory from the 
Kennedy-Thorndike attack - led to the prediction of a special 'quadratic' Doppler effect (cf. 
Griinbaum 1973, 723-724), In other words, the auxiliary dilation hypothesis i not ad hocl, too. 
Secondly, the ad-hoc-ness of the contraction hypothesis is discussed in the methodological 
literature to the best of my knowledge xclusively in terms of the MME-KTE-case, This is rather 
strange, because there exists a second experimental rest of the contraction hypothesis which is 
without doubt independent of the KTE. This is the experiment of Wood, Tomlinson and Essen 
(WTE), published in 1937 (cf. Wood/Tomlinson/Essen 1937). WTE use sound waves in asolid rod 
(instead of light waves) to detect he contraction. A rotating rod, that is during one revolution 
sometimes oriented in the direction of the earth's orbital motion and sometimes perpendicular to 
it, should undergo, on the contraction hypothesis, a change of length. This should result in a 
corresponding change of frequency of the rod's longitudinal vibration. No such effect occurred. 
In other words, as in the Kennedy-Thorndike-case, the contraction hypothesis is in fact 
independently testable and fails in this independent test. 
It is noteworthy that also the WTE experiment is not a 'waterproof' alsification of the 
contraction hypothesis. Lorentz's account could have been saved by assuming a change of the 
rod's elasticity to the extent hat the change of length would be exactly compensated (a suggestion 
WTE indeed put forth). Yet I am not aware of any possibility to test this rescuing hypothesis. 
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vice versa several assumptions into a single one. Furthermore, in addition to 
this 'language dependance effect', one hypothesis might not suffice to solve an 
anomaly, 68 so that several auxiliary assumptions may be needed instead. 
Maxwell's first gas theory of 1860 only achieved its baffling novel predictions 
with the aid of the following three hypotheses: (1) molecules are to be 
regarded as elastic spheres, (2) after a collision all directions of movement are 
equally probable, and (3) the distribution of any velocity component is
independent of the distribution of the other components. 69 Obviously, we 
cannot expect each auxiliary assumption (together with the preceding theory) 
to clear up two anomalies. Generally, such a cut-up version will explain 
nothing at all. In such a case, however, we can apply the assessment criterion 
to the conjunction of all pertinent assumptions. In other words, we can view 
Maxwell's three tenets methodologically as constituting one hypothesis. The 
situation is quite different, however, if the conjunction of the theory T with 
the hypothesis Hi clears up anomaly el, and the conjunction of T with H2 
implies the solution of e2. In this case, we should rule out the treatment of H1 
and H2 as a methodological unit. Putting this more systematically, we can say 
that a hypothesis in the methodological sense is the minimum set of claims 
which allows for the derivation of an empirically testable relation. 7o (And it is 
required that this minimum set actually allows for the derivation of at least wo 
such relations.) In addition, as discussed above every hypothesis should be 
seen as containing a ceteris-paribus-clause. This means that the explicit 
enunciation of this clause does not constitute a separate hypothesis. This 
proposal, of course, is far removed from a logically neat criterion of 
individuation. Its actual application relies to a great extent on what appears 
intuitively plausible in a certain case of theory alteration. 
Up to now I have only considered the development within a programme and 
specified the rules for intra-programme progress. What is lacking is a 
definition of the conditions under which one programme overtakes its rival. I
would be willing to claim that a programme is superior if it is supported by a 
greater number of non-ad-hocly explained facts, taking 'non-ad-hoc' in the 
intra-programme sense. In comparing programmes, too, it is excess content 
that counts. But simply transferring the criterion for non-ad-hoc explanations 
from the intra-programme level to the inter-programme level appears inade- 
quate because this would imply that in order to count an explanation as 
supporting one programme as opposed to another one, this explanation has to 
account for at least two of the rival's anomalies. This requirement, however, 
is certainly too strict. There is hardly any hypothesis put forward in the 
history of science that could meet such a requirement. Accordingly, a theory 
should be viewed as successful if it solves its own problems decently. If, on 
the other hand, a programme indeed succeeds in explaining anomalies in the 
68 In the following I will only mention anomalies. But programme xtensions are always 
connoted. 
69 Clark 1976, 50. 
70 This criterion circumvents he language dependance problem. It is wholly irrelevant how 
many sentences uch a hypothetical proposition actually contains. 
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rival programme, such an explanation generally also constitutes an extension 
of this programme's realm of application and consequently (if brought about 
non-ad-hocly) intra-programme progress. This holds true, for example, in the 
case of Torricelli's hypothesis (as described on p. 218). This hypothesis 
explained the suction pump anomaly, i. e. an anomaly of the rival horror vacui 
programme. And at the same time this explanation is supported in the intra- 
programme sense because it enlarged the scope of the pertinent programme in
a non-ad-hoc fashion (being accompanied by two additional predictions). 
One problem, however, deserves particular attention. How does one assess 
an auxiliary hypothesis which resolves asufficient number of anomalies, but in 
turn also creates further difficulties. Boltzmann's arbitrary exclusion of the 
vibrational and the third rotational degrees of freedom for diatomic molecules 
by his model of two rigidly connected spheres correctly explained the 
anomalous values for the ratio of the specific heats of diatomic gases. It also 
correctly predicted the occurrence of the third rotational degree of freedom in 
the polyatomic molecules of heavy gases with the correct value for the ratio of 
the specific heats. If Boltzmann's olution been taken seriously from a 
dynamical point of view, however, the result would have been an infinite 
specific heat of gases. 71 The model thus solved two anomalies, but suffered 
from an empirical difficulty the preceding programme version had not 
encountered. According to the assessment criterion, both an empirical 
problem which the precursor had not exhibited as well as the reemergence of a 
previously resolved anomaly counts as support for the preceding variant. Such 
a case thus has a negative influence on the net support for the theoretical 
modification. Since Boltzmann's proposal i  d hoc172, it has to be rejected on 
methodological grounds. 73 
The criterion I have presented requires that a programme be supported by 
more facts than its rival if it is to be considered as superior. I am thus rejecting 
Lakatos's requirement that a programme which supersedes its rival must 
explain the entire unrefuted content of this rival. TM It is legitimate for a 
programme to replace an older one even if the acceptance of the new 
programme is accompanied by a certain reduction in explanatory power, i. e. 
by a 'Kuhn loss', provided that it manages to overcompensate the def ct at 
another place. Geocentric theory, for example, isan often quoted example of a 
Kuhn loss. Together with Aristotelian dynamics, it explained why bodies are 
not carried away from the earth's urface or why a stone thrown perpendicular 
to the earth's surface returns to its original position. The Copernican 
programme, on the other hand, was at a loss to account for these vents until a 
7t Clark 1976, 84. 
72 "Ad hoe1' is used here in a slightly altered sense. It refers not only to the number of known 
independent empirical consequences of a hypothesis but also to the number of known empirical 
problems created by this hypothesis. 
73 The situation changed completely some decades later when Boltzmann's auxiliary hypothesis 
became a theorem of quantum mechanics. This shows how risky an enterprise science (and, of 
course, methodology) actually is. We can never be sure when we dismiss a hypothesis as ad hoe 
whether science some day will prove us wrong. 
74 Lakatos 1970, 32. 
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new dynamics was developed. A similar case occurred around 1830 when the 
wave programme gained general acceptance at the expense of the excellent 
corpuscular explanation of dispersion, which it was not able to replace with a 
satisfactory equivalent. Not until 1886 did the wave programme succeed in 
overcoming this difficulty. 75 In all these cases, however, the theory as a whole 
provided more new non-ad-hoc explanations than were lost in its adoption. 
The gains, in other words, outnumbered the losses. The assessment criterion I 
am proposing no longer equires that all debts be settled first in such cases. It 
balances gains and losses. The excess number of non-ad-hoc explanations is the 
critical factor. The emphasis on non-ad-hoc-ness al o represents an answer to 
Worrall's criticisms. Worrall objected that the initial version of the theoretical 
criterion over-emphasized temporal priority when a programme is expanded 
into an area whose problems the competitor had not yet ackled (see p. 214). 
On the basis of the approach sketched re, however, it is not only temporal 
priority but additional methodological qualifications that make a hypothesis 
acceptable. If a programme succeeds in bringing about non-ad-hoc penetration 
into an area previously neglected by the adversary programme, what it 
explains that the rival does not explain counts as excess content and hence as 
support. This, however, holds true only as long as the: competitor offers no 
non-ad-hoc explanation of his own. If he manages to neutralize the excess 
content, the new programme loses its advantage. Although Worrall's objection 
that a fact used as supporting evidence for one programme cannot be used to 
support a rival programme is valid, this peculiarity does not question the 
adequacy of the assessment criterion because it no longer refers to just any 
explanation but to qualified accounts. 
There are some remarks I would like to add on the role of the programme 
heuristic, According to the view presented here, agreement or disagreement 
with the programme heuristic has no influence on the acceptance orrepudiation 
of a hypothesis. A hypothesis which develops organically out of a programme 
heuristic has no initial advantage over an assumption which runs counter to the 
general trend of the programme. The empirical hurdles are the same for both. 
This does not mean, however, that the programme heuristic is a negligeable 
quantity or that the vicissitudes of a programme should be as highly regarded as 
a sophisticated and long-term research strategy. On the contrary, Lakatos's 
concept of positive heuristic provides an excellent means of characterizing the 
continuity peculiar to mature science. My objection isthat recent changes in the 
MSRP transformed the heuristic into a veritable deus ex machina. 
The heuristic riterion judges methodological quality in terms of a theory's 
'descent' by making assessment dependent on the genesis of a theory. Popper 
calls such a procedure a 'pedigree theory of validity'. In his view any theory 
regardless of its origin has to legitimize itself by expounding its own empirical 
achievements. 76 Agassi modifies Popper's version of the pedigree theory, 
which takes descent as the hallmark of quality, by regarding descent as an 
zs cf. Worrall 1978a, 63-64. 
r6 Popper 1963, 21-27. 
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explanation of quality. 77 The snob, Agassi argues, would say that someone, 
who is an aristocrat, is good. One needs no other verification of his 
superiority. The reasonable conservative, on the other hand, tests someone's 
qualities and explains his good results as a function of aristocratic birth. In 
contrast to the snob, he asserts that there is a high correlation between descent 
and quality, but does not renounce independent tests. 7s In my opinion, this 
second variant of the pedigree theory places heuristic factors in the proper ole 
in the MSRP. Programmes with a coherent development, whose single stages 
develop out of an articulate heuristic generally have a better chance of 
achieving excess empirical content han a patched-up series of unrelated 
hypotheses. Precisely because a strong heuristic favours empirical success it is 
not necessary to introduce it a second time into the acceptance rules. 
Programmes with powerful heuristic guidelines generally manage to clear the 
empirical hurdles. If agreemen t with the programme heuristic is not able to 
support an idea, this agreement can still motivate the scientist to continue in 
the same direction. The conflict with the programme heuristic, on the other 
hand, may point to difficulties independent of the known anomalies. Since the 
heuristic establishes a rationality of pursuit in the sense mentioned above, it 
hints not at the acceptance of hypotheses but at their improvement. 
The assessment criterion, as I have presented it, approves not only the 
confirmed prediction of genuinely novel facts, but also the inclusion of 
previously known, but as yet unrelated facts in one theory. Scientific progress 
often means integrating disparate facts. What is most important, however, is to 
distinguish between genuinely novel relationships and the linguistically 
disguised reuse of well-known facts. This is what Watkins' antitrivialization 
principle requires 79 and this, it seems, is what Lakatos failed to do when he 
liberalized his initially strict predictivism. 
Appealing to the Lakatos's true intentions, however, does not constitute a 
justification. The criterion eeds more than just a noble descent. It has to bear 
fruit; and this fruit should be empirical. Arguing for methodological criteria 
should not rely exclusively on an appeal to intuitions, guided by a few examples. 
These criteria have to be checked systematically against the history of science. The 
approach I have outlined must be judged by its ability to explain and justify a 
greater number of events in the history of science than the other MSRP versions. 80 
I am grateful to Dr. G. Wolters for his comments on a previous version of 
this paper and to Mr. S. Gillies for his help in improving my English style. 
Special thanks to my wife who metamorphosed a collection of scattered and 
almost illegible notes into an accurately t ped manuscript. 
Manuscript submitted May 1985. Final version March 1986. 
77 Agassi 1977, 34. 
78 Ib id .  
79 cf. note 38. 
80 For this procedure for appraisingthe adequacy of amethodologycompare L katos 1971; cf. also 
Carrier 1986. 
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